SriBhashya - Ramanuja's Commentary
On Brahma Sutra (Vedanta Sutra)
Ramanujacharya's Brahma Sutra Bhashya
translated By George Thibaut
Second Adhyaya
Fourth Pada
FOURTH PÂDA.
1. Thus the prânas.After having taught that Ether and all the other elements are effects, and hence have originated, the Sûtras had shown that the individual soul, although likewise an effect, does not originate in the sense of undergoing a change of essential nature; and had in connexion therewith clearly set forth wherein the essential nature of the soul consists. They now proceed to elucidate the question as to the origination of the instruments of the individual soul, viz. the organs and the vital breath.
The point here to be decided is whether the organs are effects as the individual soul is an effect, or as ether and the other elements are. As the soul is, thus the prânas are, the Pûrvapakshin maintains. That means--as the soul is not produced, thus the organs also are not produced--For the latter point no less than the former is directly stated in Scripture; the wording of the Sûtra 'thus the prânas' being meant to extend to the case of the prânas also, the authority of Scripture to which recourse was had in the case of the soul.--But what is the scriptural text you mean?
'Non-being, truly this was in the beginning. Here they say, what was that? Those Rishis indeed were that Non-being, thus they say. And who were those Rishis? The prânas indeed were those Rishis.' This is the passage which declares that before the origination of the world the Rishis existed. As 'prânâh' is in the plural, we conclude that what is meant is the organs and the vital air. Nor can this text be interpreted to mean only that the prânas exist for a very long time(but are not uncreated); as we may interpret the texts declaring Vâyu and the atmosphere (antariksha) to be immortal: 'Vâyu and the atmosphere are immortal'; 'Vâyu is the deity that never sets' (Bri. Up. II, 3, 3; I, 5, 22). For the clause 'Non-being indeed was
p. 569
this in the beginning' declares that the prânas existed even at the time when the entire world was in the pralaya state. Those texts, then, which speak of an origination of the prânas must be explained somehow, just as we did with the texts referring to the origination of the individual soul.
To this the Siddhântin replies, 'the prânas also originate in the same way as ether, and so on.'--Why?--Because we have scriptural texts directly stating that before creation everything was one, 'Being only this was in the beginning,' 'The Self only was this in the beginning.' And moreover, the text 'from that there is produced the prâna and the mind and all organs'(Mu. Up. II, 3, 1) declares that the organs originated; they therefore cannot have existed before creation. Nor is it permissible to ascribe a different meaning to the texts which declare the origination of the sense-organs--as we may do in the case of the texts declaring the origination of the soul. For we have no texts directly denying the origination of the sense-organs, or affirming their eternity, while we have such texts in the case of the individual soul. In the text quoted by the Pûrvapakshin, 'Non-being indeed was this in the beginning,' &c., the word prâna can denote the highest Self only; for from texts such as 'All these beings indeed enter into breath alone, and from breath they arise'(Kh. Up. I, 11, 5), the word prâna is known to be one of the designations of the highest Self. And as to the clause 'the prânas indeed are those Rishis,' we remark that the term Rishi may properly be applied to the all-seeing highest Self, but not to the non-intelligent organs.
But how then is the plural form 'the Rishis are the prânas' to be accounted for? This the next Sûtra explains.
The plural form exhibited by the text must be taken (not in its literal, but) in a secondary figurative sense, since there is no room there for a plurality of things. For Scripture
p. 570
declares that previous to creation the highest Self only exists.
For the following reason also the word 'prâna,' in the text quoted, can denote Brahman only. Speech, i.e. the names which have for their object all things apart from Brahman, presupposes the existence of the entire universe of things--ether, and so on--which is the object of speech. But, as according to the text 'this was then non-differentiated; it was thereupon differentiated by names and forms,' then (i.e. before the differentiation of individual things), no things having name and form existed, there existed also no effects of speech and the other organs of action and sensation, and hence it cannot be inferred that those organs themselves existed.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the origination of the prânas.'
The question here arises whether those organs are seven only, or eleven--the doubt on this point being due to the conflicting nature of scriptural texts.--The Pûrvapakshin maintains the former alternative.--On what grounds?--'On account of going, and of specification.' For the text refers to the 'going,' i.e. to the moving about in the different worlds, together with the soul when being born or dying, of seven prânas only, 'seven are these worlds in which the prânas move which rest in the cave, being placed there as seven and seven' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 8)--where the repetition 'seven and seven' intimates the plurality of souls to which the prânas are attached. Moreover those moving prânas are distinctly specified in the following text, 'when the five instruments of knowledge stand still, together with the mind (manas), and when the buddhi does not move, that they call the highest "going"' (gati--Ka. Up. II, 6, 10). The 'highest going' here means the moving towards Release, all movement within the body having
p. 571
come to an end. As thus the text declares that at the time of birth and death seven prânas only accompany the soul, and as, with regard to the condition of final concentration, those prânas are distinctly specified as forms of knowledge (gñânâni), we conclude that the prânas are the seven following instruments of the soul--the organs of hearing, feeling, seeing, tasting and smelling, the buddhi and the manas. In various other passages indeed, which refer to the prânas, higher numbers are mentioned, viz. up to fourteen, speech, the hands, the feet, the anus, the organ of generation, the ahankâra and the kitta being added to those mentioned above; cp. e.g. 'there are eight grahas' (Bri. Up. III, 2, i); 'Seven are the prânas of the head, two the lower ones '(Taitt. Samh. V, 3, 2, 5). But as the text says nothing about those additional organs accompanying the soul, we assume that they are called prânas in a metaphorical sense only, since they all, more or less, assist the soul.--This view the next Sûtra sets aside.
The organs are not seven only, but eleven, since the hands and the rest also contribute towards the experience and fruition of that which abides in the body, i.e. the soul, and have their separate offices, such as seizing, and so on. Hence it is not so, i.e. it must not be thought that the hands and the rest are not organs. Buddhi, ahankâra and kitta, on the other hand, are(not independent organs but) mere designations of the manas, according as the latter is engaged in the functions of deciding (adhyavasâya), or misconception (abhimâna, or thinking (kintâ). The organs therefore are eleven. From this it follows that in the passage 'Ten are these prânas in man, and Âtman is the eleventh'(Bri. Up. II, 4, ii), the word Âtman denotes the manas. The number eleven is confirmed by scriptural and Smriti passages, cp. 'the ten organs and the one' (Bha. Gî. XIII, 5); 'ten are the vaikârika beings, the manas is the eleventh,' and others. Where more organs
p. 572
are mentioned, the different functions of the manas are meant; and references to smaller numbers are connected with special effects of the organs, such as accompanying the soul, and the like.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the going of the seven.'
As the text 'these are all alike, all infinite' (Bri. Up. I, 5, 13), declares speech, mind, and breath to be infinite, we conclude that the prânas are all-pervading.--To this the Sûtra replies, that they are minute; for the text 'when the vital breath passes out of the body, all the prânas pass out after it' (Bri. Up. V, 4, 2), proves those prânas to be of limited size, and as when passing out they are not perceived by bystanders, they must be of minute size--The text which speaks of them as infinite is a text enjoining meditation ('he who meditates on them as infinite'), and infinity there means only that abundance of activities which is an attribute of the prâna to be meditated on.
By 'the best' we have to understand the chief vital air (mukhya prâna), which, in the colloquy of the prânas, is determined to be the best because it is the cause of the preservation of the body. This chief vital air the Pûrvapakshin maintains to be something non-created, since Scripture (Ri. Samh. V, 129, 2), 'By its own law the One was breathing without wind,' shows that an effect of it, viz. the act of breathing, existed even previously to creation, at the time of a great pralaya; and because texts declaring it to have been created--such as 'from him is born breath' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3)--may be interpreted in the same way as the texts declaring that the soul is something created (sec p. 540 ff.).--To this the reply is that, since this view contradicts scriptural statements as to the oneness of all, previous to creation; and since the Mundaka-text declares the prâna to have been created in the same way as earth and the other elements; and since there are no texts plainly denying its createdness, the chief vital air also must
p. 573
be held to have been created. The words 'the One was breathing without wind' by no means refer to the vital breath of living creatures, but intimate the existence of the highest Brahman, alone by itself; as indeed appears from the qualification 'without wind.'--That the vital breath, although really disposed of in the preceding Sûtras, is specially mentioned in the present Sûtra, is with a view to the question next raised for consideration.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the minuteness of the prânas.'
Is this main vital breath nothing else but air, the second of the elements? Or is it a certain motion of the air? Or is it air that has assumed some special condition?--The first alternative may be adopted, on account of the text 'prâna is air.'--Or, since mere air is not called breath, while this term is generally applied to that motion of air which consists in inhalation and exhalation, we may hold that breath is a motion of air.--Of both these views the Sûtra disposes by declaring 'not so, on account of separate statement.' For in the passage 'From him there is produced breath,mind,and all sense-organs,ether and air,' &c, breath and air are mentioned as two separate things. For the same reason breath also cannot be a mere motion or function of air; for the text does not mention any functions of fire and the other elements, side by side with these elements, as separate things (and this shows that breath also cannot, in that text, be interpreted to denote a function of air). The text 'prâna is air,' on the other hand, intimates (not that breath is identical with air. but) that breath is air having assumed a special form, not a thing altogether different from it, like fire. In ordinary language, moreover, the word breath does not mean a mere motion but a substance to which motion belongs; we say,'the breath moves to and fro in inhalation and exhalation.'
Is breath, which we thus know to be a modification of air, to be considered as a kind of elementary substance, like fire, earth, and so on? Not so, the next Sûtra replies.
Breath is not an element, but like sight and the rest, a special instrument of the soul. This appears from the fact that the texts mention it together with the recognised organs of the soul, the eye, and so on; so e.g. in the colloquy of the prânas. And such common mention is suitable in the case of such things only as belong to one class.--The 'and for other reasons' of the Sûtra refers to the circumstance of the principal breath being specially mentioned among the organs comprised under the term 'prâna'; cp. 'that principal breath' (Kh. Up. I, 2, 7); 'that central breath' (Bri. Up. I, 5, 21).--But if the chief breath is, like the eye and the other organs, an instrument of the soul, there must be some special form of activity through which it assists the soul, as the eye e.g. assists the soul by seeing. But no such activity is perceived, and the breath cannot therefore be put in the same category as the organs of sensation and action!--To this objection the next Sûtra replies.
The karana of the Sûtra means kriyâ, action. The objection raised on the ground that the principal breath does not exercise any form of activity helpful to the soul, is without force, since as a matter of fact Scripture declares that there is such an activity, in so far as the vital breath supports the body with all its organs. For the text (Kh. Up. V, 1, 7 ff.) relates how on the successive departure of speech, and so on, the body and the other organs maintained their strength, while on the departure of the vital breath the body and all the organs at once became weak and powerless.--The conclusion therefore is that the breath, in its fivefold form of prâna, apâna, and so on, subserves the purposes of the individual soul, and thus occupies the position of an instrument, no less than the eye and the other organs.
p. 575
But as those five forms of breath, viz. prâna, udâna, &c., have different names and functions they must be separate principles (and hence there is not one principal breath)! To this the next Sûtra replies.
As desire, and so on, are not principles different from mind, although they are different functions and produce different effects--according to the text, 'Desire, purpose, doubt, faith, want of faith, firmness, absence of firmness, shame, reflection, fear--all this is mind' (Bri. Up. I,,5, 3); so, on the ground of the text, 'prâna, apâna, vyâna, udâna, samâna--all this is prâna' (ibid.), apâna and the rest must be held to be different functions of prâna only, not independent principles.--Here terminates the adhikarana of what is 'a modification of air.'
This prâna also is minute, since as before (i.e. as in the case of the organs) the text declares it to pass out of the body, to move, and so on, 'him when he passes out the prâna follows after' (Bri. Up. V, 4, 2). A further doubt arises, in the case of prâna, owing to the fact that in other texts it is spoken of as of large extent, 'It is equal to these three worlds, equal to this Universe' (Bri. Up. I, 3, 22); 'On prâna everything is founded'; 'For all this is shut up in prâna.' But as the texts declaring the passing out, and so on, of the prâna, prove it to be of limited size, the all-embracingness ascribed to prâna in those other texts must be interpreted to mean only that the life of all living and breathing creatures depends on breath.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the minuteness of the best.'
p. 576
It has been shown that the prânas, together with the main prâna, originate from Brahman, and have a limited size. That the prânas are guided by Agni and other divine beings has also been explained on a previous occasion, viz. under Sû. II, 1, 5. And it is known from ordinary experience that the organs are ruled by the individual soul, which uses them as means of experience and fruition. And this is also established by scriptural texts, such as 'Having taken these prânas he (i.e. the soul) moves about in his own body, according to his pleasure'(Bri. Up. II, 1, 18). The question now arises whether the rule of the soul and of the presiding divine beings over the prânas depends on them (i.e. the soul and the divinities) only, or on some other being.--On them only, since they depend on no one else!--Not so, the Sûtra declares. The rule which light, and so on, i.e. Agni and the other divinities, together with him to whom the prânas belong i.e. the soul, exercise over the prânas, proceeds from the thinking of that, i.e. from the will of the highest Self.--How is this known?--'From scriptural statement.' For Scripture teaches that the organs, together with their guiding divinities and the individual soul, depend in all their doings on the thought of the highest Person. 'He, who abiding within Fire, rules Fire from within.--He, who abiding within the air--within the Self--within the eye, and so on' (Bri. Up III, 7); 'From fear of it the wind blows, from fear of it the sun rises, from fear of it Agni and Indra, yea Death runs as the fifth' (Taitt. Up. II, 8, 1); 'By the command of that Imperishable one, sun and moon stand, held apart'(Bri Up III, 8, 9).
As the quality, inhering in all things, of being ruled by the highest Self, is eternal and definitely fixed by being connected with his essential nature, it is an unavoidable conclusion that the rule of the soul and of the divinities over the organs depends on the will of the highest Self. The text, 'Having sent forth this he entered into it, having entered into it he became sat and tyat' (Taitt. Up. II, 6), shows that the entering on the part of the highest Person
p. 577
into all things, so as to be their ruler, is connected with his essential nature. Similarly Smriti says, 'Pervading this entire Universe by a portion of mine I do abide' (Bha. Gî. X, 42).--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the rule of Fire and the rest.'
Are all principles called prânas to be considered as 'organs' (indriyâni), or is the 'best,' i.e. the chief prâna, to be excepted?--All of them, without exception, are organs; for they all are called prânas equally, and they all are instruments of the soul.--Not so, the Sûtra replies. The 'best' one is to be excepted, since only the prawas other than the best are designated as organs. Texts such as 'the organs are ten and one' (Bha. Gî. XIII, 5) apply the term 'organ' only to the senses of sight and the rest, and the internal organ.
Texts such as 'from him is born prâna, and the internal organ, and all organs' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 3) mention the vital breath separately from the organs, and this shows that the breath is not one of the organs. The passage indeed mentions the internal organ (manas) also as something separate; but in other passages the manas is formally included in the organs, 'the (five) organs with mind as the sixth' (Bha. Gî. XV, 7). That the vital breath differs in nature from the organ of sight and the rest, is a matter of observation. For in the state of deep sleep the function of breath is seen to continue, while those of the eye, and so on, are not perceived. The work of the organs, inclusive of the manas, is to act as instruments of cognition and action, while the work of breath is to maintain the body and the organs. It is for the reason that the subsistence of the organs depends on breath, that the organs themselves are called prânas. Thus Scripture says, 'they all became the form of that (breath), and therefore they are called after him prânas' (Bri. Up. I, 5, 21). 'They became
p. 578
its form' means--they became its body, their activity depended on it.--Here terminates the adhikarana of'the organs.'
The Sûtras have shown that the creation of the elements and organs in their collective aspect (samashti) and the activity of the individual souls proceed from the highest Self; and they have also further confirmed the view that the rule which the souls exercise over their organs depends on the highest Self. A question now arises with regard to the creation of the world in its discrete aspect (vyashti), which consists in the differentiation of names and forms (i.e. of individual beings). Is this latter creation the work of Hiranyagarbha only, who represents the collective aggregate of all individual souls; or, fundamentally, the work of the highest Brahman having Hiranyagarbha for its body--just as the creation of water e.g. is the work of the highest Brahman having sire for its body?--The Pûrvapakshin maintains the former alternative. For, he says, the text 'Having entered with this living-soul-self (anena gîvenât-manâ), let me differentiate names and forms' (Kh. Up. VI, 3, 2), declares the gîva-soul to be the agent in differentiation. For the resolve of the highest deity is expressed, not in the form 'let me differentiate names and forms by myself (svena rûpena), but 'by this soul-self,' i.e. by a part of the highest Self, in the form of the individual soul.--But on this interpretation the first person in 'vyâkaravâni' (let me enter), and the grammatical form of 'having entered,' which indicates the agent, could not be taken in their literal, but only in an implied, sense--as is the case in a sentence such as 'Having entered the hostile army by means of a spy, I will estimate its strength' (where the real agent is not the king, who is the speaker, but the spy).--The cases are not analogous, the Pûrvapakshin replies. For the king and the spy are fundamentally separate, and hence the king is agent by implication only. But in the
p. 579
case under discussion the soul is a part, and hence contributes to constitute the essential nature of, the highest Self; hence that highest Self itself enters and differentiates in the form of the soul. Nor can it be said that the instrumental case ('with this soul-self') has the implied meaning of association ('together with this soul-self'); for if a case can be taken in its primary sense, it is not proper to understand it in a sense which has to be expressed by means of a preposition. But the third case, gîvena, cannot here be understood even in its primary sense, i.e. that of the instrument of the action; for if Brahman is the agent in the acts of entering and differentiating, the soul is not that which is most suitable to accomplish the end of action (while yet grammar defines the instrumental case--karana--on this basis). Nor can it be said that the activity of the soul comes to an end with the entering, while the differentiation of names and forms is Brahman's work, for the past participle (pravisya) indicates (according to the rules of grammar) that the two actions--of entering and differentiating--belong to the same agent. And although the soul as being a part of the highest Self shares in its nature, yet in order to distinguish it from the highest Self, the text by means of the clause 'with that living Self refers to it as something outward (not of the nature of the Self). The agent in the action of differentiation of names and forms therefore is Hiranyagarbha. Smriti texts also ascribe to him this activity; cp.'he in the beginning made, from the words of the Veda, the names and forms of beings, of the gods and the rest, and of actions.'
Against this view the Sûtra declares itself. The differentiation of names and forms belongs to him who renders tripartite, i.e. the highest Brahman; since it is assigned by Scripture to the latter only. For the text 'That divinity thought, let me, having entered these three beings with this living-soul-self, differentiate names and forms--let me make each of these three tripartite,' shows that all the activities mentioned have one and the same agent. But the rendering tripartite cannot belong to Brahma (Hiranyagarbha), who abides within the Brahma-egg, for that egg
p. 580
itself is produced from fire, water, and earth, only after these elements have been rendered tripartite; and Smriti says that Brahmâ himself originated in that egg, 'in that egg there originated Brahmâ, the grandfather of all the worlds.' As thus the action of rendering tripartite can belong to the highest Brahman only, the differentiation of names and forms, which belongs to the same agent, also is Brahman's only.--But how then does the clause 'with that living-soul-self' fit in?--The co-ordination 'with that soul, with the Self,' shows that the term 'soul' here denotes the highest Brahman as having the soul for its body; just as in the clauses 'that fire thought'; 'it sent forth water'; 'water thought,' and so on, what is meant each time is Brahman having fire, water, and so on, for its body. The work of differentiating names and forms thus belongs to the highest Brahman which has for its body Hiranyagarbha, who represents the soul in its aggregate form. On this view the first person (in 'let me differentiate') and the agency (conveyed by the form of 'pravisya') may, without any difficulty, be taken in their primary literal senses; and the common agency, implied in the connexion of pravisya and vyâkaravâni, is accounted for. The view here set forth as to the relation of Brahman and Hiranyagarbha also explains how the accounts of Hiranyagarbha's (Brahmâ's) creative activity can say that he differentiated names and forms.
The whole passus beginning 'that divinity thought,' therefore has the following meaning--'Having entered into those three beings, viz. Fire, Water, and Earth, with my Self which is qualified by the collective soul (as constituting its body), let me differentiate names and forms, i.e. let me produce gods and all the other kinds of individual beings, and give them names; and to that end, since fire, water, and earth have not yet mutually combined, and hence are incapable of giving rise to particular things, let me make each of them tripartite, and thus fit them for creation.'--The settled conclusion then is, that the differentiation of names and forms is the work of the highest Brahman only.
But, an objection is raised, the fact that the differentiation
p. 581
of names and forms must be due to the same agent as the rendering tripartite, does not after all prove that the former is due to the highest Self. For the rendering tripartite may itself belong to the individual soul. For the text relates how, after the creation of the cosmic egg, a process of tripartition was going on among the individual living beings created by Brahmâ. 'Learn from me, my friend, how those three beings having reached man become tripartite, each of them. The earth when eaten is disposed of in three ways; its grossest portion becomes feces, its middle portion flesh, its subtlest portion mind,' and so on. Similarly, in the preceding section, it is described how the process of tripartition goes on in the case of fire, sun, moon, and lightning, which all belong to the world created by Brahmâ, 'the red colour of burning fire is the colour of fire,' &c. And the text moreover states the original tripartition to have taken place after the differentiation of names and forms: 'That divinity having entered into these three beings differentiated names and forms. Each of these (beings) it rendered tripartite.'--To this objection the next Sûtra replies.
The view that the description of tripartition, given in the passage 'each of these he made tripartite,' refers to a time subsequent to the creation of the mundane egg and to the gods created by Brahmâ, cannot be upheld. For from it there would follow that, as in the passage 'earth when eaten is disposed of in three ways,' &c., flesh is declared to be more subtle than feces, and mind yet subtler, it would have to be assumed--in agreement with the nature of the causal substance--that flesh is made of water and manas of fire 1. And similarly we should have to assume that urine
p. 582
[paragraph continues] --which is the grossest part of water drunk (cp. VI, 5, 2)--is of the nature of earth, and breath, which is its subtlest part, of the nature of fire. But this is not admissible; for as the text explicitly states that earth when eaten is disposed of in three ways, flesh and mind also must be assumed to be of an earthy nature. In the same way we must frame our view concerning 'the two others,' i.e. water and fire, 'according to the text.' That means--the three parts into which water divides itself when drunk, must be taken to be all of them modifications of water, and the three parts of fire when consumed must be held to be all of them modifications of fire. Thus feces, flesh and mind are alike transformations of earth; urine, blood and breath transformations of water; bones, marrow and speech transformations of fire.
This moreover agrees with the subsequent statement (VI, 5, 4), 'For, truly, mind consists of earth, breath of water, speech of fire.' The process of tripartition referred to in VI, 3, 4, is not therefore the same as the one described in the section that tells us what becomes of food when eaten, water when drunk, &c. Were this (erroneous) assumption made, and were it thence concluded that mind, breath and speech--as being the subtlest created things--are made of fire, this would flatly contradict the complementary text quoted above ('mind consists of earth,' &c.). When the text describes how earth, water and fire, when eaten, are transformed in a threefold way, it refers to elements which had already been rendered tripartite; the process of tripartition must therefore have taken place before the creation of the cosmic egg. Without such tripartition the elements would be incapable of giving rise to any effects; such capability they acquire only by being mutually conjoined, and that is just the process of tripartition. In agreement herewith Smriti says, 'Separate from each other, without connexion, those elements with their various powers were incapable of producing creatures. Bul having combined completely, entered into mutual conjunction, abiding one within the other, the principles--from the highest Mahat down to
p. 583
individual things--produced the mundane egg.'--When the text therefore says (VI, 3, 3) 'The divinity having entered into those three beings with that soul-self differentiated names and forms; he made each of these tripartite,' the order in which the text mentions the activities of differentiation and tripartition is refuted by the order demanded by the sense 1.--The text then proceeds to exemplify the process of tripartition, by means of burning fire, the sun and lightning, which indeed are things contained within the mundane egg (while yet the tripartition of elements took place before the egg, with all its contents, was created); but this is done for the information of Svetaketu, who himself is a being within the mundane egg, and has to be taught with reference to things he knows.
But, a final objection is raised, as on this view of the matter the elements--earth, water and fire--which are eaten and drunk, are already tripartite, each of them containing portions of all, and thus are of a threefold nature, how can they be designated each of them by a simple term--earth, water, fire?--To this the next Sûtra replies.
Each element indeed is of a threefold nature, owing to the primary tripartition; but as in each mixed element one definite element prevails--so that each element has a distinctive character of its own--a definite designation is given to each.--The repetition (of 'that designation') in the Sûtra indicates the completion of the adhyâya.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the fashioning of names and forms.'
SriBhashya - Ramanuja's Commentary
On Brahma Sutra (Vedanta Sutra)
Ramanujacharya's Brahma Sutra Bhashya
translated By George Thibaut
THIRD ADHYÂYA.
FIRST PÂDA.
1. In obtaining another of that, it goes enveloped, (as appears) from question and explanation.That the Vedânta-texts establish as the proper object of meditation, on the part of all men desirous of Release, the highest Brahman, which is the only cause of the entire world, which is not touched by even a shadow of imperfection, which is an ocean, as it were, of supremely exalted qualities, and which totally differs in nature from all other beings--this is the point proved in the two previous adhyâyas; there being given at the same time arguments to disprove the objections raised against the Vedânta doctrine on the basis of Smriti and reasoning, to refute the views held by other schools, to show that the different Vedânta-texts do not contradict each other, and to prove that the Self is the object of activities (enjoined in injunctions of meditation, and so on). In short, those two adhyâyas have set forth the essential nature of Brahman. The subsequent part of the work now makes it its task to enquire into the mode of attaining to Brahman, together with the means of attainment. The third adhyâya is concerned with an enquiry into meditation--which is the means of attaining to Brahman; and as the motive for entering on such meditation is supplied by the absence of all desire for what is other than the thing to be obtained, and by the desire for that thing, the points first to be enquired into are the imperfections of the individual soul--moving about in the different worlds, whether waking or dreaming or merged in dreamless sleep, or in the state of swoon; and those blessed characteristics by which Brahman is raised above all these imperfections. These are the topics of the first and second pâdas of the adhyâya.
The first question to be considered is whether the soul,
p. 585
when moving from one body into another, is enveloped by those subtle rudiments of the elements from which the new body is produced, or not. The Pûrvapakshin maintains the latter alternative; for, he says, wherever the soul goes it can easily provide itself there with those rudiments. Other reasons supporting this primâ facie view will be mentioned and refuted further on.--The Sûtra states the view finally accepted, 'In obtaining another "of that" it goes enveloped.' The 'of that' refers back to the form, i.e. body, mentioned in II, 4, 17. The soul when moving towards another embodiment goes enveloped by the rudiments of the elements. This is known 'from question and explanation,' i.e. answer. Question and answer are recorded in the 'Knowledge of the five fires' (Kh. Up. V, 3-10), where Pravâhana, after having addressed to Svetaketu several other questions, finally asks 'Do you know why in the fifth libation water is called man?' In answer to this last question the text then explains how the Devas, i.e. the prânas attached to the soul, offer into the heavenly world, imagined as a sacrificial fire, the oblation called sraddhâ; how this sraddhâ changes itself into a body con sisting of amrita, which body is called moon; how the same prânas offer this body of amrita in Parganya, imagined as a fire, whereupon the body so offered becomes rain; how the same prânas throw that rain on to the earth, also imagined as a sacrificial fire, whereupon it becomes food; how this food is then offered into man, also compared to fire, where it becomes seed; and how, finally, this seed is offered into woman, also compared to a fire, and there becomes an embryo. The text then goes on, 'Thus in the fifth oblation water becomes purushavakas,' i.e. to be designated by the term man. And this means that the water which, in a subtle form, was throughout present in the previous oblations also, now, in that fifth oblation, assumes the form of a man.--From this question and answer it thus appears that the soul moves towards a new embodiment, together with the subtle rudiments from which the new body springs.--But the words, 'water becomes purushavakas,' only intimate that water assumes
p. 586
the form of a man, whence we conclude that water only invests the soul during its wanderings; how then can it be held that the soul moves invested by the rudiments of all elements?--To this question the next Sûtra replies.
Water alone could not produce a new body; for the text Kh. Up. VI, 3, 4, 'Each of these he made tripartite,' shows that all the elements were' made tripartite to the end of producing bodies. That the text under discussion mentions water only, is due to the predominance of water; and that among the elements giving rise to a new body water predominates, we infer from the fact that blood and the other humours are the predominating element in the body.
That the soul goes embedded in the subtle rudiments of the elements follows therefrom also that when passing out of the old body it is said to be followed by the prânas, 'when he thus passes out, the chief prâna follows after him,' &c. (Bri. Up. V, 4, 2). Compare also Smriti: 'It draws to itself the organs of sense, with the mind for the sixth. When the Ruler (soul) obtains a new body, and passes out of another, he takes with him those organs and then moves on, as the wind takes the odours from their abodes (the flowers)' (Bha. Gî. XV, 8). But the prânas cannot move without a substrate, and hence we must admit that the rudiments of the elements--which are their substrate--are also moving.
But the text, 'when the speech of the dead person enters into fire,' &c. (Bri. Up. III, 2, 13). declares that when a person dies his organs go into fire, and so on.; they cannot therefore accompany the soul. Hence the text which
p. 587
asserts the latter point must be explained in some other way!--Not so, the Sûtra replies. The text stating that the organs go to fire, and so on, cannot be taken in its literal sense; for it continues,'the hairs of the body enter into herbs, the hair of the head into trees' (which manifestly is not true, in its literal sense). The going of speech, the eye, and so on, must therefore be understood to mean that the different organs approach the divinities (Agni and the rest) who preside over them.
An objection is raised to the conclusion arrived at under III, 1, 1; on the ground that in the first oblation, described in Kh. Up. V, 4, 2, as being made into the heavenly world, water is not mentioned at all as the thing offered. The text says, 'on that altar the gods offer sraddhâ'; and by sraddhâ (belief) everybody understands a certain activity of mind. Water therefore is not the thing offered.--Not so, we reply. It is nothing else but water, which there is called sraddhâ. For thus only question and answer have a sense. For the question is, 'Do you know why in the fifth libation water is called man?' and at the outset of the reply sraddhâ is mentioned as constituting the oblation made into the heavenly world viewed as a fire. If here the word sraddhâ did not denote water, question and answer would refer to different topics, and there would be no connexion. The form in which the final statement is introduced (iti tu pañkamyâm, &c., 'but thus in the fifth oblation,' &c.), moreover, also intimates that sraddhâ means water. The word 'iti,' thus, here intimates that the answer is meant to dispose of the question, 'Do you know how?' &c. Sraddhâ becomes moon, rain, food, seed, embryo in succession, and thus the water comes to be called man. Moreover, the word sraddhâ is actually used in the Veda in the sense of 'water'; 'he carries water, sraddhâ indeed is water' (Taitt. Samh. I, 6, 8, 1). Aad what the text says as
p. 588
to king Soma (the moon) originating from sraddhâ when offered, also shows that sraddhâ must mean water.
But, a further objection is raised, in the whole section under discussion no mention at all is made of the soul; the section cannot therefore prove that the soul moves, enveloped by water. The text speaks only of different forms of water sraddhâ and the rest.--This, the Sûtra points out, is not so, on account of those who perform sacrifices being understood. For further on in the same chapter it is said, that those who, while destitute of the knowledge of Brahman, practise sacrifices, useful works and alms, reach the heavenly world and become there of the essence of the moon (somarâgânah); whence, on the results of their good works being exhausted, they return again and enter on a new embryonic state (Kh. Up. V, 10). Now in the preceding section (V, 9) it is said that they offer sraddhâ in the heavenly world, and that from that oblation there arises the king Soma--an account which clearly refers to the same process as the one described in V, 10. We herefrom infer that what is meant in V, 9 is that that being which was distinguished by a body of sraddhâ, becomes a being distinguished by a body of the nature of the moon. The word body denotes that the nature of which it is to be the attribute of a soul, and thus cxtends in its connotation up to the soul. The meaning of the section therefore is that it is the soul which moves enveloped by water and the other rudimentary elements.--But the phrase 'him the gods eat' (V, 10, 4) shows that the king Soma cannot be the soul, for that cannot be eaten!--To this the next Sûtra replies.
He who performs sacrifices, and so on, and thus does not know the Self, is here below and in yonder world a mere
p. 589
means of enjoyment for the devas. He serves them here, by propitiating them with sacrifices, and so on; and when the gods, pleased with his service, have taken him up into yonder world, he there is a common means of enjoyment for them (since they are gratified by the presence of a faithful servant). That those not knowing the Self serve and benefit the gods, Scripture explicitly declares, 'He is like a beast for the devas' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10). Smriti also declares, that while those who know the Self attain to Brahman, those who do not know it are means of enjoyment for the devas, 'To the gods go the worshippers of the gods, and they that are devoted to me go to me' (Bha. Gî. VII, 23). When Scripture speaks of the soul being eaten by the gods, it therefore only means that the soul is to them a source of enjoyment. That eating the soul means no more than satisfaction with it, may also be inferred from the following scriptural passage, 'The gods in truth do not eat nor do they drink; by the mere sight of that amrita they are satisfied.'--It thus remains a settled conclusion that the soul moves enveloped by the subtle rudiments of the elements.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the obtaining of another body.'
The text declares that those who only perform sacrifices and useful works ascend by the road of the fathers, and again return to the earth when they have fully enjoyed the fruit of their works, 'having dwelt there yâvat sampâtam, they return by the same way' (Kh. Up. V, 10, 5). The question here arises whether the descending soul carries a certain remainder (anusaya) of its works or not.--It does not, since it has enjoyed the fruit of all its works. For by 'anusaya' we have to understand that part of the karman which remains over and above the part retributively enjoyed; but when the fruit of the entire karman has been enjoyed, there is no such remainder. And that this is so we learn from the phrase 'yâvat sampâtam
p. 590
ushitvâ,' which means 'having dwelt there as long as the karman lasts' (sampatanty anena svargalokam iti sampâtah). Analogously another text says, 'Having obtained the end of whatever deed he does on earth, he again returns from that world to this world to action' (Bri. Up. V, 4, 6).--Against this primâ facie view the Sûtra declares 'with a remainder he descends, on account of what is seen, i.e. scriptural text, and Smriti.' The scriptural text is the one 'Those whose conduct has been good' (V, 10, 7), which means that among the souls that have returned, those whose karman is good obtain a good birth as Brâhmanas or the like, while those whose karman is bad are born again as low creatures-dogs, pigs, Kândâlas, and the like. This shows that the souls which have descended are still connected with good or evil karman. Smriti also declares this: 'Men of the several castes and orders, who always stand firm in the works prescribed for them, enjoy after death the rewards of their works, and by virtue of a remnant (of their works) they are born again in excellent countries, castes and families, endowed with beauty, long life, learning in the Vedas, wealth, good conduct, happiness and wisdom. Those who act in a contrary manner perish' (Gautama Dha. Sû. XI, 29); 'Afterwards when a man returns to this world he obtains, by virtue of a remainder of works, birth in a good family, beauty of form, beauty of complexion, strength, aptitude for learning, wisdom, wealth, and capacity for fulfilling his duties. Therefore, rolling like a wheel (from the one to the other), in both worlds he dwells in happiness' (Âpast. Dha. Sû. II, 1, 2, 3). The clause 'as long as his works last' (yâvat-sampâtam) refers to that part of his works only which was performed with a view to reward (as promised for those works by the Veda); and the same holds true with regard to the passage 'whatever work man does here on earth' (Bri. Up. V, 4, 6). Nor is it possible that works, the fruit of which has not yet been enjoyed, and those the result of which has not been wiped out by expiatory ceremonies, should be destroyed by the enjoyment of the fruits of other works. Hence those who have gone to that world return with
p. 591
a remnant of their works, 'as they went and not so'--i.e. in the same way as they ascended and also in a different way. For the ascent takes place by the following stages--smoke, night, the dark half of the moon, the six months of the sun's southern progress, the world of the fathers, ether, moon. The descent, on the other hand, goes from the place of the moon, through ether, wind, smoke, mist, cloud. The two journeys are alike in so far as they pass through ether, but different in so far as the descent touches wind, and so on, and does not touch the world of the fathers, and other stages of the ascent.
In the phrases 'those whose works were good' (ramanîya-karanâh), and 'those whose works were bad' (kapûyâ-karanâh), the word karana does not denote good and evil works (i.e. not such works as the Veda on the one hand enjoins as leading to certain rewards, and on the other prohibits, threatening punishment), for, in Vedic as well as ordinary language, the term karana is generally used in the sense of âkâra, i.e. general conduct. In ordinary speech such words as âkâra, sîla, vritta are considered synonymous, and in the Veda we read 'whatever works (karmâni) are blameless, those should be regarded, not others. Whatever our good conduct (su-karitâni) was, that should be observed by thee, nothing else' (Taitt. Up. I, 11, 2)--where 'works' and 'conduct' are distinguished. Difference in quality of birth therefore depends on conduct, not on the remainder of works performed with a view to certain results.--This primâ facie view the Sûtra sets aside, 'not so,because the scriptural term karana connotes works; thus the teacher Kârshnâgini thinks.' For mere conduct does not lead to experiences of pleasure and pain; pleasure and pain are the results of works in the limited sense.
But if conduct has no result, it follows that good conduct,
p. 592
as enjoined in the Smritis, is useless!--Not so, we reply; for holy works enjoined by the Veda depend on conduct, in so far as a man of good conduct only is entitled to perform those works. This appears from passages such as the following: 'A man who is not pure is unfit for all religious work,' and 'Him who is devoid of good conduct the Vedas do not purify.' Kârshnâgini's view thus is, that the karana of the text implies karman.
As the verb â-kar takes karman for its object (punyam karmâ karati, &c.), and as the separate denotation (i.e. the use of apparently equivalent words, viz. âkar and karman) can be accounted for on the ground that one of them refers to works established by manifest texts, and the other to texts inferred from actually existing rules of good conduct; and as, when the primary meaning is possible, no secondary meaning must be adopted; nothing else but good and evil works (in the Vedic sense) are denoted by the word karana: such is the opinion of the teacher Bâdari. This opinion of Bâdari, the author of the Sûtra states as representing his own. On the other hand, he adopts the view of Kârshnagini in so far as he considers such items of virtuous conduct as the Sandhyâ--which are enjoined by scriptural texts, the existence of which is inferred on the basis of conduct as enjoined by Smriti--to have the result of qualifying the agent for the performance of other works.--The conclusion therefore is that the souls descend, carrying a remnant of their works.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the passing of works.'
It has been said that those who perform only sacrifices, and so on, go to the moon and thence return with a remainder of their works. The question now arises whether those also who do not perform sacrifices go to the moon. The phrase 'who do not perform sacrifices' denotes evil-doers
p. 593
of two kinds, viz. those who do not do what is enjoined, and those who do what is forbidden.--These also go to the moon, the Pûrvapakshin maintains; for the text contains a statement to that effect, 'All who depart from this world go to the moon' (Ka. Up. I, 2)--where it is said that all go, without any distinction. So that those who perform good works and those who perform evil works, equally go to the moon.--This the next Sûtra negatives.
Of the others, i.e. those who do not perform sacrifices, and so on, there is ascent to the moon and descent from there, only after they have in the kingdom of Yama suffered the punishments due to their actions. For the text declares that evil-doers fall under the power of Yama, and have to go to him, 'He who thinks, this is the world there is no other, falls again and again under my sway' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 6); 'the son of Vivasvat, the gathering place of men' (Rik Samh. X, 14, 1); 'King Yama,' and other texts.
That all beings are under the sway of Yama, Parâsara also and other Smriti writers declare, 'And all these pass under the sway of Yama.'
The Smritis moreover declare that there are seven hells, called Raurava, and so on, to which evil-doers have to go.--But how do they, if moving about in those seven places, reach the palace of Yama?
As their going to those seven places also is due to the command of Yama, there is no contradiction.--Thus those also who do not perform sacrifices, and so on, after having gone to the world of Yama, and there undergone punishments
p. 594
according to the nature of their works, later on ascend to the moon and again descend from there.--Of this conclusion the next Sûtra disposes.
The 'but' sets aside the view developed so far. It cannot be admitted that those also who do not perform sacrifices, and so on, reach the moon; because the path of the gods and the path of the fathers are meant for the enjoyment of the fruits 'of knowledge and work.'That is to say--as those who do not perform sacrifices cannot ascend by the path of the gods, since they are destitute of knowledge; so they also cannot go by the path of the fathers, since they are destitute of meritorious works. And that these two paths are dependent respectively on knowledge and works, we know from the fact that these two are the leading topics. For knowledge forms the leading topic with regard to the path of the gods,'Those who know this, and those who in the forest follow faith and austerities, go to light,' &c.; and works have the same position with regard to the path of the fathers,"they who living in a village perform sacrifices, &c. go to the smoke," &c. The text, 'all those who depart from this world go to the moon,' must therefore be interpreted to mean 'all those who perform sacrifices go to the moon.'--But if evil-doers do not go to the moon, the fifth oblation cannot take place, and no new body can be produced. For the text says, 'In the fifth oblation water is called man,' and, as we have shown, that fifth oblation presupposes the soul's going to the moon. In order, therefore, to understand how in their case also a new embodiment is possible, it must needs be admitted that they also ascend to the moon.--To this the next Sûtra replies.
The third 'place' does not, for the origination of a new body, depend on the fifth oblation. The term,'the third
p. 595
place,' denotes mere evil-doers. That these do not, for the origination of a new body, depend on the fifth oblation, is seen from Scripture. For, in answer to the question 'Do you know why that world never becomes full?' the text says, 'On neither of these two ways are those small creatures continually returning, of whom it may be said, Live and die. This is the third place. Therefore that world never becomes full.' As this passage states that in consequence of 'the third place' (i.e. the creatures forming a third class) not ascending to and descending from the heavenly world that world never becomes full, it follows that that third place does not, for the origination of bodies, depend on the fifth oblation. The clause, 'in the fifth oblation,' moreover, merely states that the connexion of water with the fifth fire is the cause of the water 'being called man' (i. e. becoming an embryo), but does not deny the origination of embryos in other ways; for the text contains no word asserting such a limitation.
Smriti, moreover, states that the bodies of some specially meritorious persons, such as Draupadî, Dhrishtadyumna and others, were formed independently of the fifth oblation' (i.e. sexual union).
And it is seen in Scripture also, that the bodies of some beings originate independently of the fifth oblation: 'Of all beings there are indeed three origins only, that which springs from an egg, that which springs from a living being, that which springs from a germ' (Kh. Up. VI, 3, 1). It is observed that from among these beings those springing from a germ and those springing from heat originate without that fifth oblation.--But the text quoted does not refer to the creatures springing from heat; for it says that there are three origins only!--To this the next Sûtra replies.
p. 596
Creatures sprung from heat are included in the third term--viz. that which springs from a germ--which is exhibited in the text quoted. The settled conclusion therefore is that the evil-doers do not go to the moon.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'those who do not perform sacrifices.'
The text describes the manner in which those who perform sacrifices, and so on, descend from the moon as follows: 'They return again that way as they came, to the ether, from the ether to the air. Then having become air they become smoke, having become smoke they become mist,' &c. The doubt here arises whether the soul when reaching ether, and so on, becomes ether in the same sense as here on earth it becomes a man or other being, or merely becomes similar to ether, and so on.--The former view is the true one; for as the soul in the sraddhâ state becomes the moon, so it must likewise be held to become ether, and so on, there being no reason for a difference in the two cases.--This primâ facie view the Sûtra sets aside. The descending soul enters into similarity of being with ether, and so on; since there is a reason for this. When the soul becomes a man or becomes the moon, there is a reason for that, since it thereby becomes capacitated for the enjoyment of pain and pleasure. But there is no similar reason for the soul becoming ether, and so on, and hence the statement that the soul becomes ether, and so on, can only mean that, owing to contact with them, it becomes similar to them.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'entering into similarity of being.'
Does the soul in its descent through ether, and so on, stay at each stage for a not very long time, or is there nothing to define that time?--It stays at each stage for an indefinite time, there being nothing to define the time.--
p. 597
Not so, the Sûtra decides. For there is a special statement, i.e. the text says that when the soul has become rice or grain or the like, the passing out of that stage is beset with difficulties. From this we infer that as there is no such statement concerning the earlier stages, the soul stays at each of them for a short time only.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the not very long time.'
The text declares that (he descending souls are born as rice, corn, &c., 'they are born here as rice, corn, herbs, trees,' &c. The question here is whether the souls cling to plants animated by other souls which have those plants for their bodies; or whether the descending souls themselves are born with those plants for their bodies.--The latter view is the right one; for the text says, 'they are born as rice, grain,' and so on, and this expression is of the same kind as when we say 'he is born as a man, as a deva,' and so on. The text therefore means that the souls are embodied in the different plants.--This view the Sûtra rejects. The souls merely cling to those plants which constitute the bodies of other souls; 'since the statement is as in the previous cases,' i.e. because the text only says that the souls become plants as it had previously been said that they become ether, and so on. Where the text means to say that the soul enters on the condition of an enjoying soul (i.e. of a soul assuming a new body for the purpose of retributive enjoyment), it refers to the deeds which lead to such enjoyment; so e. g. in the passage, 'Those whose works have been good obtain a good birth,' &c. But in the text under discussion there is no such reference to karman. For those works--viz. sacrifices and the like--which were undertaken with a view to reward, such as enjoyment of the heavenly world, are, in the case of the descending souls, completely wiped out by the enjoyment of the heavenly world (which precedes the descent of the souls); and those works on the other hand, the action of which has not yet begun, lead to the embodiments mentioned
p. 598
further on ('Those whose works are good'). And in the interval between those two conditions no new karman originates. When, therefore, the text says that the souls are born as plants, the statement cannot be taken in its literal sense.
The conclusion arrived at above cannot be accepted, since there is a reason why the descending soul should enter on the condition of an enjoying soul. Such works as sacrifices, the fruit of which is the enjoyment of the heavenly world, are mixed with evil, for they imply injury to living beings as in the case of the goat offered to Agnîshomau. And such injury is evil as it is forbidden by texts such as 'let him not harm any creature.' Nor can it be said that the injunctions of sacrificing animals constitute exceptions to the general rule of not harming any creature.--For the two injunctions refer to different things. The injunction to kill the goat for Agnîshomau intimates that the killing of the animal subserves the accomplishment of the sacrifice, while the injunction not to 'harm' teaches that such harming has disastrous consequences. Should it be said that the prohibition of harming does not refer to such actions as the sacrifice of the goat which proceed on the basis of scriptural injunction, but only to such actions as spring from natural passion or desire (râga); we remark that in the case of sacrifices also the action is equally prompted by natural desire. Injunctions such as 'He who desires the heavenly world is to sacrifice', teach that sacrifices are to be undertaken by persons desirous of certain pleasant results, and such persons having thus learned by what means the result is to be accomplished proceed to action from the natural desire of the result. This applies to the killing of the goat also which is offered to Agnîshomau; man learns from Scripture that such actions help to accomplish the sacrifice which effects the result, and then performs those actions from natural desire. The case in no way differs from that of harm
p. 599
done in ordinary life--where the agent always is prompted by natural desire, having somehow arrived at the conclusion that his action will accomplish something aimed at by himself. The same holds good with regard to works of permanent obligation. Men learn from Scripture that through the performance of the special duties of their caste they attain happiness of the highest kind, and then apply themselves to their duties from a natural desire of such happiness, and therefore such works also are mixed with evil. Hence the souls of those who have performed sacrifices, and so on, which contain an element of evil, at first experience in the heavenly world that result which is to be enjoyed there, and then embodying themselves in non-moving things such as plants, experience the fruit of that part of their actions which is of a harmful nature. That embodiment in non-moving beings is the result of evil deeds Smriti declares: 'Owing to those defects of work which are due to the body, a man becomes a non-moving being.' From all this it follows that the souls embody themselves in plants to the end of enjoying the fruits of their works.--To this the Sûtra replies--it is not so, on account of scriptural statement. For Scripture declares that the killing of sacrificial animals makes them to go up to the heavenly world, and therefore is not of the nature of harm. This is declared in the text, 'The animal killed at the sacrifice having assumed a divine body goes to the heavenly world'; 'with a golden body it ascends to the heavenly world.' An action which is the means of supreme exaltation is not of the nature of harm, even if it involves some little pain; it rather is of beneficial nature.--With this the mantra also agrees: 'Thou dost not die, thou goest to the gods on easy paths; where virtuous men go, not evil-doers, there the divine Savitri may lead thee.' An act which has a healing tendency, although it may cause a transitory pain, men of insight declare to be preservative and beneficial.
The declaration that the descending souls become rice plants, and so on, cannot be taken literally for that reason also, that the text afterwards declares them to become those who perform the act of generation: 'Whoever the being may be that eats the food and begets offspring, that being he (i.e. the soul that has descended) becomes.' Now the meaning of this latter text can only be that the soul enters into conjunction with the creature which eats the grain; and hence we have to interpret the previous text, as to the soul's becoming a plant, in the same way.
Only after having reached a yoni the soul, affected with a remnant of its works, obtains a new body, and only in a body there can be the enjoyment of pleasure and pain. When, therefore, previous to that the soul is said to reach ether, wind, and so on, this can only mean that it enters into conjunction with them.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'that animated by another soul.'
Third Adhyaya
Second Pada
SECOND PÂDA.
1. In the intermediate sphere the creation (is effected by the soul); for (Scripture) says (so).
So far it has been shown that the soul in the waking state suffers affliction since, in accordance with its deeds, it goes, returns, is born, and so on. Next an enquiry is instituted into its condition in the state of dream. With reference to the state of dreaming Scripture says, 'There are no chariots in that state, no horses, no roads; then he creates chariots, horses and roads. There are no blessings, no happiness, no joys; then he himself creates blessings, happiness, joys, and so on. For he is the creator' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 10). A doubt here arises whether this creation of chariots and the rest is accomplished by the individual soul, or by the Lord.--'The creation in the intermediate state' is due to the individual soul only. 'The intermediate state' means the sphere of dreams, in agreement with the passage 'There is a third intermediate state, the place of dreams' (Bri. Up. IV, 3, 1). And that creation is effected by the soul only; for what is referred to in the passages 'he creates,' 'For he is the maker,' is none other but the dreaming soul.
And the followers of one sâkhâ state in their text that the dreaming soul is the shaper of its desires: 'He, the person who is awake in those who sleep, shaping one desired thing (kâma) after the other.' The term 'kâma' there denotes not mere desires, but such things as sons and the like which are objects of desire. For sons and so on are introduced as 'kâmas' in previous passages: 'Ask for all kâmas according to thy wish'; 'Choose sons and grandsons living a hundred years' (Ka. Up. I, 1, 25; 23). The individual soul thus creates chariots, and so on, in its dreams. That the soul has the power of realising all its
wishes is known from the declaration of Pragâpati. It is therefore able to create, even in the absence of special instruments.--This view is set aside by the next Sûtra.
The things appearing in dreams-chariots, lotus tanks, and so on--are absolute Mâyâ, i.e. things created by the Supreme Person. For the term 'Mâyâ' denotes wonderful things, as appears from passages such as 'She was born in the race of Ganaka, appearing like the wonderful power of the divine being in bodily shape' (devamâyâ). The sense of the passage 'there are no chariots,' &c. then is--there are no chariots and horses to be perceived by any other person but the dreaming one; and then 'he creates chariots,' &c.--i. e. the Supreme Person creates things to be perceived by the dreamer and persisting for a certain time only. Those things therefore are of a wonderful nature (but not illusions). And the creation of such wonderful things is possible for the Supreme Person who can immediately realise all his wishes; but not for the individual soul. The latter also, indeed, fundamentally possesses that power; but as in the Samsâra state the true nature of the soul is not fully manifested, it is then incapable of accomplishing such wonderful creations. The text 'the person shaping one desired thing after the other' declares the Supreme Person to be the creator, for the clauses immediately preceding and following that text (viz. 'He who is awake in those who sleep'; and 'that is the Bright, that is Brahman, that alone is called the Immortal; all worlds are contained in it and no one goes beyond'--Ka. Up. II, 5, 8) mention attributes distinctively characteristic of the Supreme Person. And the Bri. Up. text, 'For he is the maker,' must therefore, in agreement with the Katha-text, also be understood as declaring that it is the Supreme Person only that creates the things seen in a dream.--But if it is the true nature of the soul to be free from all imperfections, and so on, why then does this not manifest itself?--To this the next Sûtra replies.
The but sets the objection aside. Owing to the wish of the highest, i.e. the Supreme Person, the essential nature of the individual soul is hidden. The Supreme Person hides the true, essentially blessed, nature of the soul which is in a state of sin owing to the endless chain of karman. For this reason we find it stated in Scripture that the bondage and release of the soul result from the wish of the Supreme Person only 'when he finds freedom from fear and rest in that invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported; then he has gone to fearlessness '; 'for he alone causes blessedness'; 'from fear of it the wind blows' (Taitt. Up. II, 7, 8).
The obscuration of the soul's true nature results either from the soul's connexion with the body or from its connexion with the power of matter in a subtle state. As long as the creation lasts, the soul is obscured by its connexion with matter in the form of a body; at the time of a pralaya, on the other hand, by its connexion with matter of so exceedingly subtle a kind as not to admit of differentiation by means of name and form. As thus its true nature is not manifest, the soul is unable to create, in dreams, chariots, lotus tanks, and so on, by its mere wish. And what the texts say about a being that is awake in those who sleep and is the abode of all worlds ('in that all the worlds abide, and no one goes beyond it'--Ka. Up. II, 4, 9) can apply to the Supreme Person only. The things seen by an individual soul in its dreams therefore are specially created by the Supreme Person, and are meant by him to be a retribution--whether reward or punishment--for deeds of minor importance: they therefore last for the time of the dream only, and are perceived by that one soul only.
The things seen in dreams are not created by the wish of the individual soul for this reason also, that according to Scripture dreams are prophetic of future good or ill fortune. 'When a man engaged in some work undertaken for some special wish sees a woman in his dream, he may infer success from his dream vision.' Those also who understand the science of dreams teach that dreams foreshadow good and evil fortune. But that which depends on one's own wish can have no prophetic quality; and as ill fortune is not desired the dreamer would create for himself only such visions as would indicate good fortune. Hence the creation which takes place in dreams can be the Lord's work only.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the intermediate state.'
Next the state of deep dreamless sleep is enquired into. Scripture says, 'When a man is asleep, reposing and at perfect rest, so that he sees no dream, then he lies asleep in those nâdîs' (Kh. Up. VIII, 6, 3); 'When he is in profound sleep and is conscious of nothing, there are seventy-two thousand veins called hita which from the heart spread through the pericardium. Through them he moves forth and rests in the pericardium' (Bri. Up. II, 1, 19). 'When a man sleeps here, he becomes united with the True' (Kh. Up. VI, 8, 1). These texts declare the veins, the pericardium, and Brahman to be the place of deep sleep; and hence there is a doubt whether each of them in turns, or all of them together, are that place. There is an option between them, since they are not in mutual dependence, and since the sleeping soul cannot at the same time be in several places!--To this the Sûtra replies--the absence of dreams, i.e. deep sleep takes place in the veins, in the pericardium, and in the highest Self together; since these three are declared by Scripture. When different alternatives may be combined, on the ground of there being
p. 605
different effects in each case, it is improper to assume an option which implies sublation of some of the alternatives. And in the present case such combination is possible, the veins and the pericardium holding the position of a mansion, as it were, and a couch within the mansion, while Brahman is the pillow, as it were. Thus Brahman alone is the immediate resting-place of the sleeping soul.
Since Brahman alone directly is the place of deep sleep, Scripture is able to declare that the souls awake from that, i.e. Brahman; compare 'Having come back from the True they do not know that they come from the True' (Kh. Up. VI, io, 2), and other texts.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the absence of that.'
Does the same person who had gone to sleep rise again at the time of waking, or a different one?--Since the soul in deep sleep frees itself from all limiting adjuncts, unites itself with Brahman, and thus being in no way different from the released soul, is no longer in any way connected with its previous body, organs, and so on; the person rising from sleep is a different one.--This view the Sûtra sets aside, saying 'but the same.' For there remains the work, i.e. the good and evil deeds previously done by the sleeper, for which the same person has to undergo retribution before the knowledge of truth arises. There is next remembrance--'I, the waking person, am the same as I who was asleep.' Scripture also declares this: 'Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion, or tiger, or wolf, &c., that they become again' (Kh. Up. VI, io, 2). And, lastly, the injunctions which enjoin certain acts for the sake of final Release would be purportless if the person merged in deep sleep attained Release. Nor can it be said that the sleeping soul is free from all limiting adjuncts and manifests itself in its true nature (so as not to be different from the released soul). For with regard to the sleeping
p. 606
person the text says,'In truth he thus does not know himself that he is I, nor does he know anything that exists. He is gone to utter annihilation. I see no good in this' (Kh. Up. VIII, ii, 1); while, on the other hand, the texts, 'Having approached the highest light he manifests himself in his true nature; he moves about there laughing, playing, delighting himself; 'He becomes a Self-ruler; he moves about in all the worlds according to his wish'; 'The seeing one sees everything, and attains everything everywhere' (Kh. Up. VIII, 12, 3; VII, 25, 2; 26, 2), declare that the released soul is all-knowing, and so on. What is true about the sleeping person is that he is still comprised within the Samsâra, but for the time having put off all instruments of knowledge and action and become incapable of knowledge and enjoyment repairs to the place of utter rest, i.e. the highest Self, and having there refreshed himself, again rises to new enjoyment of action.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'work, remembrance, text, and injunction.'
With regard to a person lying in a swoon or stunned, the question arises whether that state of swoon is one of the other states, viz. deep sleep and so on, or whether it is a special condition of its own.--The former alternative must be accepted. For the term 'swoon' may be explained as denoting either deep sleep or some other acknowledged state, and there is no authority for assuming an altogether different new state.--This view the Sûtra sets aside. The condition of a swooning person consists in reaching half, viz. of what leads to death; for this is the only hypothesis remaining. A swoon cannot be either dreaming or being awake; for in a swoon there is no consciousness. And as it is different in character as well as in the occasions giving rise to it from deep sleep and death, it cannot be either of those two states; for there are special circumstances occasioning a swoon, such as a blow on the head. The only possible alternative then is to view a swoon as a state in
p. 607
which there is made a half-way approach to death. For while death consists in the complete cessation of the soul's connexion with the body or organs of any kind, a swoon consists in the soul's remaining connected with the subtle body and organs only. Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the swooning person.'
The different states of the individual soul have been discussed, to the end that an insight into their imperfections may give rise to indifference towards all worldly enjoyments. Next now, in order to give rise to the desire of attaining to Brahman, the Sûtras proceed to expound how Brahman's nature is raised above all imperfections and constituted by mere blessed qualities. The following point requires to be considered first. Do those imperfections which cling to the individual soul in consequence of its different states--viz. the waking state, dreams, deep sleep, swoon, departure from the body--affect also the highest Brahman which as its inner Ruler abides within the soul in those different states, or not?--They do affect it, since Brahman abides within the bodies which are in those different states.--But Sûtras such as I, 2, 8 have already declared that the highest Brahman, because not subject to the influence of karman, is free from all imperfections; how then can imperfections cling to it for the reason that it is connected with this or that place?--In the following way. As was shown under III, 2, 6, works give rise to imperfection and suffering in so far as they cause the connexion of the soul with a body. The efficient cause therein is the imperfection inherent in the connexion with a body; for otherwise the works themselves would directly give rise to pain, and what then would be the use of the connexion with a body? Hence, even in the case of a being not subject to karman, its connexion with various unholy bodies will cause imperfection and suffering. And even when such a being voluntarily enters into such bodies in order to rule
p. 608
them, connexion with imperfections is unavoidable; no less than to be immersed in blood and purulent matter, even if done voluntarily, will make a man unclean. Although therefore Brahman is the sole cause of the world and a treasure-house of all blessed qualities, yet it is affected by the imperfections springing therefrom that, as declared by Scripture, it abides within matter, bodies, and their parts, and thus is connected with them (cp. 'he who abides within earth, within the soul, within the eye, within the seed,' &c., Bri. Up. III, 7, 3).
Of this primâ facie view the Sûtra disposes by saying--'Not even from place, such as earth, soul, &c., is there possible for the highest Self a shadow even of imperfection; since everywhere in Scripture as well as Smriti Brahman is described as having characteristics of a double kind; viz. on the one hand freedom from all imperfections, and on the other possession of all blessed qualities. For Scripture says that the Supreme Person is free from evil, free from old age, free from death, free from grief, free from hunger and thirst; that all his wishes realise themselves, that all its purposes realise themselves' (Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 5)--And Smriti says, 'He comprises within himself all blessed qualities, by a particle of his power the whole mass of beings is supported. In him there are combined energy, strength, might, wisdom, valour, and all other noble qualities. He is the Highest of the high, no pain or other imperfections affect him, the Lord of all, high or low. From all evil he is free, he whose name is Vishnu, the highest abode.' These and other passages teach that Brahman possesses the double characteristics stated above.
But, an objection is raised, we observe, that the individual soul also, although in reality possessing the same twofold attributes, viz. freedom from all evil and so on, as we learn from the teaching of Pragâpati (Kh. Up. VIII, 7), yet is affected with imperfections owing to the fact that it is
p. 609
connected with bodies, divine, human, and so on, and thus undergoes a variety of conditions. Analogously we cannot avoid the conclusion that the inner Ruler also, although in reality possessing those same twofold attributes, is also affected by imperfection, because through its connexion with those different bodies it likewise undergoes a variety of conditions.--This objection the Sûtra sets aside in the words, 'not so, because with reference to each the text says what is not that,' i.e. what is contrary. For where the text says that the inner Ruler dwells within the earth, within the soul, within the eye, and so on, it concludes each clause by saying, 'that is thy Self, the inner Ruler, the immortal one,' i.e. declares the inner Ruler to be immortal, and thus denies of him any imperfections due to his connexion with the bodies which he voluntarily enters in order to rule them. The true (perfect) nature of the individual soul, on the other hand, is obscured as long as it is connected with a body, as we have explained under III, 2, 5.--But, as the Pûrvapakshin has pointed out, even if the highest Self voluntarily enters into bodies, it cannot escape connexion with the imperfections which depend on the essential nature of those bodies.--Not so, we reply. The fact is, that not even non-sentient things are, essentially or intrinsically, bad; but in accordance with the nature of the works of those beings which are under the rule of karman, one thing, owing to the will of the Supreme Person, causes pain to one man at one time and pleasure at another time, and causes pleasure or pain to one person and the opposite to another person. If the effects of things depended on their own nature only, everything would at all times be productive for all persons, either of pleasure only or of pain only. But this is not observed to be the case. In agreement herewith Smriti says, 'Because one and the same thing causes pain and pleasure and envy and wrath, the nature of a thing cannot lie in itself. As the same thing which erst gave rise to love causes pain later on, and that which once caused anger now causes satisfaction, nothing is in itself of the nature either of pleasure or of pain.' To the soul therefore which is subject
p. 610
to karman the connexion with different things is the source of imperfection and suffering, in agreement with the nature of its works; while to the highest Brahman, which is subject to itself only, the same connexion is the source of playful sport, consisting therein that he in various ways guides and rules those things.
Moreover, the followers of one sâkhâ explicitly teach that the connexion with one and the same body is for the individual soul a source of disadvantage, while for the highest Brahman it is nothing of the kind, but constitutes an accession of glory in so far as it manifests him as a Lord and Ruler, 'Two birds, inseparable friends, cling to the same tree. One of them eats the sweet fruit, the other looks on without eating' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 1).--But the text, 'Having entered by means of that gîva-self I will differentiate names and forms,' teaches that the differentiation of names and forms depends on the entering into the elements of the gîva-soul whose Self is Brahman, and this implies that Brahman also, as the Self of the individual soul, possesses definite shapes, divine, human, and so on, and is to be denominated by the corresponding names. Brahman thus falls within the sphere of beings to which injunctions and prohibitions are addressed--such as 'a Brâhmana is to sacrifice'--and hence necessarily is under the power of karman.--To this the next Sûtra replies.
Brahman, although by entering into bodies, human, divine, and so on, it becomes connected with various forms, yet is in itself altogether devoid of form, and therefore does not share that subjection to karman which in the case of the soul is due to its embodiedness.--Why?--Because as it is that which brings about names and forms it stands to them in the relation of a superior (pradhâna). For the text, 'The Ether (Brahman) indeed is the accomplisher
p. 611
of names and forms; that which is without these two is Brahman,' teaches that Brahman, although entering into all beings, is not touched by name and form, but is that which brings about name and form.--But, an objection is raised, if Brahman is the inner ruler of beings in so far as he has them for its body, how can it be said that it is altogether destitute of form?--There is a difference, we reply. The individual soul is connected with the shape of the body in which it dwells because it participates in the pleasures and pains to which the body gives rise; but as Brahman does not share those pleasures and pains, it has no shape or form. And the scriptural injunctions and prohibitions apply to those only who are under the power of karman. The highest Brahman therefore is like a being without form, and hence, although abiding within all things, free from all imperfection and endowed with all blessed qualities.
But, an objection is raised, texts such as 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' suggest a Brahman whose nature is constituted exclusively by non-differentiated light; while at the same time a Brahman endowed with qualities--such as omniscience, being the cause of the world, being the inner Self of all, having the power of immediately realising its wishes and purposes--is expressly negatived by texts such as 'not so, not so' (Bri. Up. II, 3, 6), and therefore must be held to be false. How then can it be maintained that Brahman possesses the 'twofold characteristics' mentioned under Sûtra 11?--To this the next Sûtra replies.
In order that texts such as 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' may not be devoid of meaning, we have to admit that light (intelligence) constitutes the essential nature of Brahman. But analogously we have also to admit that Brahman possesses the 'twofold characteristics'; for otherwise the texts declaring it to be free from all
p. 612
imperfections, all-knowing, the cause of the world, and so on, would in their turn be devoid of meaning.
Moreover the text 'the True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' only teaches that Brahman has light for its essential nature, and does not negative those other attributes of Brahman--omniscience, being the cause of the world, &c.--which are intimated by other texts. What is the object of the negation in 'not so, not so' will be shown further on
That Brahman is a treasure as it were of all blessed qualities and free from all imperfections, the whole body of Vedânta-texts clearly declares: 'That highest great lord of lords, that highest deity of deities'; 'He is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither parent nor lord '; 'There is no effect and no cause known of him, no one is seen like unto him or higher. His high power is revealed as manifold, as essential action of knowledge and strength' (Svet. Up. VI, 7-9); 'He who is all-knowing, whose brooding consists of knowledge' (Mu. I, 1,9); 'From fear of him the wind blows, from fear of him the sun moves'; 'That is one bliss of Brahman' (Taitt. Up. II, 8); 'That from which all speech with the mind turns away, not having reached it, knowing the bliss of that Brahman man fears nothing' (Taitt. Up. II, 9); 'He who is without parts, without action, tranquil, without fault, without taint' (Svet. Up. VI, l9).--And Smriti: 'He who knows me to be unborn and without a beginning, the Supreme Lord of the worlds'; 'Pervading this entire universe, by one part of mine I do abide'; 'With me as supervisor Prakriti brings forth the universe of the movable and the immovable, and for this reason the world does ever move round'; 'But another is the Supreme Person, who is called the Supreme Spirit, who pervading the three worlds supports them--the eternal Lord' (Bha. Gî. X, 3; 42; IX, 10; XV, 17);
[paragraph continues] 'The all-working, all-powerful one, rich in knowledge and strength, who becomes neither less nor more, who is self-dependent, without beginning, master of all; who knows neither weariness nor exhaustion, nor fear, wrath and desire; the blameless one, raised above all, without support, imperishable.'--As thus Brahman in whatever place it may abide has the 'twofold characteristics,' the imperfections dependent on those places do not touch it.
Because Brahman, although abiding in manifold places, ever possesses the twofold characteristics, and hence does not share the imperfections due to those places, scriptural texts illustrate its purity in the midst of inferior surroundings by comparing it to the sun reflected in water, mirrors, and the like. Compare e.g., 'As the one ether is rendered manifold by jars and the like, or as the one sun becomes manifold in several sheets of water; thus the one Self is rendered manifold by abiding in many places. For the Self of all beings, although one, abides in each separate being and is thus seen as one and many at the same time, as the moon reflected in water.'
The 'but' indicates an objection.--The highest Self is not apprehended in earth and other places in the same way as the sun or a face is apprehended in water or a mirror. For the sun and a face are erroneously apprehended as abiding in water or a mirror; they do not really abide there. When, on the other hand, Scripture tells us that the highest Self dwells in the earth, in water, in the soul, &c., we apprehend it as really dwelling in all those places. That the imperfections caused by water and mirrors do not attach themselves to the sun or a face is due to the fact that the sun and the face do not really abide in the water and the mirror. Hence there is no real parallelism
p. 614
between the thing compared (the highest Self) and the thing to which it is compared (the reflected image).
The comparison of the highest Self to the reflected sun and the rest is meant only to deny of the Self that it participates in the imperfections--such as increase, decrease, and the like--which attach to the earth and the other beings within which the Self abides.--How do we know this?--From the circumstance that on this supposition both comparisons are appropriate. In the scriptural text quoted above Brahman is compared to ether, which although one becomes manifold through the things--jars and so on--within it; and to the sun, which is multiplied by the sheets of water in which he is reflected. Now the employment of these comparisons--with ether which really does abide within the jars and so on, and with the sun which in reality does not abide in the water--is appropriate only if they are meant to convey the idea that the highest Self does not participate in the imperfections inherent in earth and so on. Just as ether, although connecting itself separately with jars, pots, and so on, which undergo increase and decrease, is not itself touched by these imperfections; and just as the sun, although seen in sheets of water of unequal extent, is not touched by their increase and decrease; thus the highest Self, although abiding within variously-shaped beings, whether non-sentient like earth or sentient, remains untouched by their various imperfections--increase, decrease, and so on--,remains one although abiding in all of them, and ever keeps the treasure of its blessed qualities unsullied by an atom even of impurity.--The comparison of Brahman with the reflected sun holds good on the following account. As the sun is not touched by the imperfections belonging to the water, since he does not really abide in the water and hence there is no reason for his sharing those imperfections, thus the highest Self,
p. 615
which really abides within earth and the rest, is not affected by their imperfections; for as the nature of the highest Self is essentially antagonistic to all imperfection, there is no reason for its participating in the imperfection of others.--'And as this is seen.' This means--Since we observe in ordinary life also that comparisons are instituted between two things for the reason that although they do not possess all attributes in common, they yet have some attribute in common. We say, e.g. 'this man is like a lion.'--The conclusion from all this is that the highest Self, which is essentially free from all imperfections and a treasure as it were of all blessed qualities, in no way suffers from dwelling within the earth and the rest.
An objection is raised. In the Brihad-âranyaka, in the chapter beginning 'There are two forms of Brahman, the material and the immaterial,' the whole material world, gross and subtle, is at first referred to as constituting the form of Brahman, and next a special form of Brahman is mentioned: 'And what is the form of that Person? Like a saffron-coloured raiment,' &c. But thereupon the text proceeds, 'Now follows the teaching--not so, not so; for there is not anything else higher than this "not so." 'This passage, referring to all the previously mentioned forms of Brahman by means of the word 'so,' negatives them; intimating thereby that Brahman is nothing else than pure Being, and that all distinctions are mere imaginations due to Brahman not knowing its own essential nature. How then can Brahman possess the twofold characteristics?--To this the next Sûtra replies.
It is impossible to understand the text 'not so, not so' as negativing those distinctions of Brahman which had been stated previously. If the text meant that, it would be mere idle talk. For none but a person not in his right mind would first teach that all the things mentioned in the earlier part of the section are distinctive attributes of Brahman--as which they are not known by any other
p. 616
means of proof--and thereupon deliberately negative his own teaching. Although among the things mentioned there are some which, in themselves, are known through other means of proof, yet they are not thus known to be modes of Brahman, and others again are known neither in themselves nor as modes of Brahman. The text therefore cannot merely refer to them as things otherwise known, but gives fundamental instruction about them. Hence the later passage cannot be meant as a sheer negation, but must be taken as denying the previously described 'so-muchness' of Brahman; i.e. the passage denies that limited nature of Brahman which would result from Brahman being viewed as distinguished by the previously stated attributes only. The word so refers to that limited nature, and the phrase not so therefore means that Brahman is not distinguished by the previously stated modes only. This interpretation is further confirmed by the fact that after that negative phrase further qualities of Brahman are declared by the text: 'For there is not anything higher than this not so. Then comes the name, the True of the True; for the prânas are the True, and he is the True of them.' That means: Than that Brahman which is expressed by the phrase 'not so' there is no other thing higher, i.e. there is nothing more exalted than Brahman either in essential nature or in qualities. And of that Brahman the name is the 'True of the True.' This name is explained in the next clause, 'for the prânas,' &c. The term prânas here denotes the individual souls, so called because the prânas accompany them. They are the 'True' because they do not, like the elements, undergo changes implying an alteration of their essential nature. And the highest Self is the 'True of the True' because while the souls undergo, in accordance with their karman, contractions and expansions of intelligence, the highest Self which is free from all sin knows of no such alternations. He is therefore more eminently true than they are. As thus the complementary passage declares Brahman to be connected with certain qualities, the clause 'not so, not so' (to which that passage is complementary) cannot deny that Brahman possesses
p. 617
distinctive attributes, but only that Brahman's nature is confined to the attributes previously stated.--Brahman therefore possesses the twofold characteristics. That the clause 'not so' negatives Brahman's being fully described by the attributes previously mentioned, was above proved on the ground that since Brahman is not the object of any other means of proof, those previous statements cannot refer to what is already proved, and that the final clause cannot therefore be meant to deny what the previous clauses expressly teach. The next Sûtra now confirms this circumstance of Brahman not lying within the sphere of the other means of proof.
Brahman is not manifested by other means of proof; for Scripture says, 'His form is not to be seen, no one beholds him with the eye' (Ka. Up. II, 6, 9); 'He is not apprehended by the eye nor by speech' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 8).
Moreover, it is only in the state of perfect conciliation or endearment, i.e. in meditation bearing the character of devotion, that an intuition of Brahman takes place, not in any other state. This Scripture and Smriti alike teach. 'That Self cannot be gained by the Veda, nor by understanding, nor by much learning. He whom the Self chooses by him the Self can be gained. The Self chooses him as his own' (Ka. Up. I, 2, 23); 'When a man's nature has become purified by the serene light of knowledge, then he sees him, meditating on him as without parts' (Mu. Up. III, 1, 9). Smriti: 'Neither by the Vedas, nor austerities, nor gifts, nor by sacrifice, but only by exclusive devotion, may I in this form be known and beheld in truth and also entered into' (Bha. Gî. XI, 53,54). The scriptural text beginning 'Two are the forms of Brahman,' which declares the nature of Brahman for the purposes of devout meditation, cannot therefore refer to Brahman's being characterised by two forms, a material and an immaterial, as something
already known; for apart from Scripture nothing is known about Brahman.
That the clause 'not so' negatives not Brahman's possessing two forms, a material and an immaterial one, but only Brahman's nature being restricted to those determinations, follows therefrom also that in the vision of Vâmadeva and others who had attained to intuition into Brahman's nature, the fact of Brahman having all material and immaterial beings for its attributes is apprehended in non-difference, i.e. in the same way as the fact of light (i.e. knowledge) and bliss constituting Brahman's essential nature. Compare the text 'Seeing this the Rishi Vâmadeva understood, I am Manu and the sun' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 10). And that light and bliss constitute Brahman's nature was perceived by Vâmadeva and the rest through repeated performance of the practice of devout meditation. In the same way then, i.e. by repeated meditation, they also became aware that Brahman has all material and immaterial things for its distinguishing modes.--The next Sûtra sums up the proof of Brahman's possessing twofold characteristics.
By the arguments stated it is proved that Brahman is distinguished by the infinite multitude of blessed qualities. And this being so, it follows that Brahman possesses the twofold characteristics.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'that which has twofold characteristics.'
It has been shown in the preceding adhikarana that
p. 619
the entire non-sentient universe is the outward form of Brahman. For the purpose of proving Brahman's freedom from all imperfection, an enquiry is now begun into the particular mode in which the world may be conceived to constitute the form of Brahman. Is the relation of the two like that of the snake and its coils; or like that of light and the luminous body, both of which fall under the same genus; or like that of the individual soul and Brahman, the soul being a distinguishing attribute and for that reason a part (amsa) of Brahman?--On the assumption of this last alternative, which is about to be established here, it has been already shown under two preceding Sûtras (I, 4, 23; II, 1, 14), that from Brahman, as distinguished by sentient and non-sentient beings in their subtle form, there originates Brahman as distinguished by all those beings in their gross form.
Which then of the alternatives stated above is the true one?--The material world is related to Brahman as the coils to the snake, 'on account of twofold designation.' For some texts declare the identity of the two: 'Brahman only is all this'; 'The Self only is all this.' Other texts again refer to the difference of the two: 'Having entered into these three deities with this gîva-self, let me differentiate names and forms.' We therefore consider all non-sentient things to be special forms or arrangements of Brahman, as the coils are of a coiled-up snake or a coiled-up rope.
The or sets aside the other two alternatives. If Brahman itself only appeared in the form of non-sentient things--as the snake itself only constitutes the coils--both sets of texts, those which declare difference as well as those which declare the unchangeableness of Brahman, would be contrary to sense. We therefore, adopting the second alternative, hold that the case under discussion is analogous to that of light and that in which it abides, i.e. the luminous body. The two are different, but at the same time they are
p. 620
identical in so far as they both are fire (tegas). In the same way the non-sentient world constitutes the form of Brahman.
The but sets aside the two preceding alternatives. One substance may indeed connect itself with several states, but the former of the two alternatives implies that Brahman itself constitutes the essential nature of non-sentient matter, and thus there is no escape from the objections already stated under Sûtra 27. Let then the second alternative be adopted according to which Brahma-hood (brahmatva) constitutes a genus inhering in Brahman as well as in non-sentient matter, just as fire constitutes the common genus for light and luminous bodies. But on this view Brahman becomes a mere abstract generic character inhering in the Lord (isvara), sentient souls and non-sentient matter, just as the generic character of horses (asvatva) inheres in concrete individual horses; and this contradicts all the teaching of Sruti and Smriti (according to which Brahman is the highest concrete entity). We therefore hold that non-sentient matter stands to Brahman in the same relation as the one previously proved for the individual soul in Sûtra II, 3, 43; 46; viz. that it is an attribute incapable of being realised apart from Brahman and hence is a part (amsa) of the latter. The texts referring to the two as non-different may thus be taken in their primary sense; for the part is only a limited place of that of which it is a part. And the texts referring to the two as different may also be taken in their primary sense; for the distinguishing attribute and that to which the attribute belongs are essentially different. Thus Brahman's freedom from all imperfection is preserved.--Lustre is an attribute not to be realised apart from the gem, and therefore is a part of the gem; the same relation also holds good between generic character and individuals having that character, between qualities and things having qualities, between bodies and souls. In the same way souls as well as non-sentient matter stand to Brahman in the relation of parts.
Texts such as 'This is that great unborn Self, undecaying, undying' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 25), 'By the old age of the body that does not age' (Kh. Up. VIII, 1, 5), deny of Brahman the properties of non-sentient matter. From this it follows that the relation of the two can only be that of distinguishing attribute and thing distinguished, and hence of part and whole. Brahman distinguished by sentient and non-sentient beings in their subtle state is the cause; distinguished by the same beings in their gross state is the effect: the effect thus is non-different from the cause, and by the knowledge of the causal Brahman the effect is likewise known. All these tenets are in full mutual agreement. Brahman's freedom from defects also is preserved; and this and Brahman's being the abode of all blessed qualities prove that Brahman possesses the 'twofold characteristics.'--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the coils of the snake.'
The Sûtras now proceed to refute an erroneous view based on some fallacious arguments, viz. that there is a being higher even than the highest Brahman, the supreme cause, material as well as operative, of the entire world--a refutation which will confirm the view of Brahman being free from all imperfections and a treasure as it were of countless transcendentally exalted qualities.--There is some entity higher than the Brahman described so far as being the cause of the world and possessing the twofold characteristics. For the text 'That Self is a bank (or bridge), a boundary' (Kh. Up. VIII, 4, 1) designates the Self as a bank or bridge (setu). And the term 'setu' means in ordinary language that which enables one to reach the other bank of a river; and from this we conclude that in the Vedic text also there must be meant something to be reached. The text further says that that bridge is to be crossed:
p. 622
[paragraph continues] 'He who has crossed that bridge, if blind,' &c.; this also indicates that there must be something to be reached by crossing. Other texts, again, speak of the highest Brahman as something measured, i.e. limited. 'Brahman has four feet (quarters), sixteen parts.' Such declarations of Brahman being something limited suggest the existence of something unlimited to be reached by that bridge. Further there are texts which declare a connexion of the bridge as that which is a means towards reaching, and a thing connected with the bridge as that to be reached: 'the highest bridge of the Immortal' (Svet. Up. VI, 19); 'he is the bridge of the Immortal' (Mu. Up. II, 2, 5). For this reason also there is something higher than the Highest.--And other texts again expressly state that being beyond the Highest to be something different: 'he goes to the divine Person who is higher than the Highest' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8); ' by this Person this whole universe is filled; what is higher than that is without form and without suffering' (Svet. Up. III, 9-10). All this combined shows that there is something higher than the highest Brahman.--The next Sûtra disposes of this view.
The 'but' sets aside the pûrvapaksha. There is no truth in the assertion that from the designation of the Highest as a biidge (or bank) it follows that there is something beyond the Highest. For Brahman in that text is not called a bank with regard to something to be reached thereby; since the additional clause 'for the non-confounding of these worlds' declares that it is compared to a bridge or bank in so far as it binds to itself (setu being derived from si, to bind) the whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient things without any confusion. And in the clause 'having passed beyond that bridge' the passing beyond means reaching; as we say, 'he passes beyond the VedAnta,' meaning 'he has fully mastered it.'
p. 623
Where the texts speak of Brahman as having four quarters, and sixteen parts, or say that 'one quarter of him are all these beings' (Kh. Up. III, 12, 6), they do so for the purpose of thought, i.e. meditation, only. For as texts such as 'the Truth, knowledge, infinite is Brahman' teach Brahman, the cause of the world, to be unlimited, it cannot in itself be subject to measure. The texts referring to measure therefore aim at meditation only, in the same way as texts such as 'Speech is one foot (quarter) of him, breath another, the eye another, the mind another' (Kh. Up. III, 18, 2).--But how can something that in itself is beyond all measure, for the purpose of meditation, be spoken of as measured? To this the next Sûtra replies.
Owing to the difference of limiting adjuncts constituted by special places, such as speech, and so on, Brahman in so far as connected with these adjuncts may be viewed as having measure; just as light and the like although spread everywhere may be viewed as limited, owing to its connexion with different places--windows, jars, and so on.
Nor is there any truth in the assertion that, because texts such as 'he is the bridge of the Immortal' intimate a distinction between that which causes to reach and the object reached, there must be something to be reached different from that which causes to reach; for the highest Self may be viewed as being itself a means towards itself being reached; cp. 'The Self cannot be reached by the Veda, and so on; he whom the Self chooses by him the Self can be gained' (Kh. Up. I, 2, 23).
Nor can we allow the assertion that there is something higher than the highest because certain texts ('the Person which is higher than the highest'; 'beyond the Imperishable there is the highest,' &c.) refer to such a difference.
[paragraph continues] For the same texts expressly deny that there is anything else higher than the highest--'than whom there is nothing else higher, than whom there is nothing smaller or larger' (Svet. Up. III, 9). So also other texts: 'For there is nothing else higher than this "not so"' (i.e. than this Brahman designated by the phrase 'not so'; Bri. Up. II, 3, 6); 'Of him none is the Lord, his name is great glory' (Mahânâr. Up. I, 10).
But what then is the entity referred to in the text 'tato yad uttarataram '? (Svet. Up. III, 10)?--The passage immediately preceding (8), 'I know that great person, &c.; a man who knows him passes over death,' had declared that the knowledge of Brahman is the only way to immortality; and the clause (9), 'Higher than whom there is nothing else,' had confirmed this by declaring that Brahman is the Highest and that there is no other thing higher. In agreement herewith we must explain stanza 10 as giving a reason for what had been said, 'Because that which is the highest (uttarataram), viz. the Supreme Person is without form and without suffering, therefore (tatah) those who know him become immortal,' &c. On any other explanation stanza 10 would not be in harmony with stanza 8 where the subject is introduced, and with what is declared in stanza 9.--Analogously in the text 'He goes to the divine Person who is higher than the highest' (Mu. Up. III, 2, 8) 'the highest' means the aggregate soul (samashâ-purusha), which in a previous passage had been said to be 'higher than the high Imperishable' (II, 1, 2); and the 'higher' refers to the Supreme Person, with all his transcendent qualities, who is superior to the aggregate soul.
That omnipresence which is possessed 'by that,' i.e. by Brahman, and which is known 'from declarations of extent,' and so on, i.e. from texts which declare Brahman to be all-pervading, is also known from texts such as 'higher than that there is nothing.' Declarations of extent are e.g. the following: 'By this Person this whole Universe is filled'
[paragraph continues] (Svet. Up. III. 9); 'whatever is seen or heard in this world, is pervaded inside and outside by Nârâyana' (Mahânâr. Up.); 'The eternal, pervading, omnipresent, which the Wise consider as the source of all beings' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 6). The 'and the rest' in the Sâtra comprises passages such as 'Brahman indeed is all this,' 'The Self indeed is all this,' and the like. The conclusion is that the highest Brahman is absolutely supreme.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'the Highest.'
It has been shown, for the purpose of giving rise to a desire for devout meditation, that the soul in all its states is imperfect, while the Supreme Person to be reached by it is free from imperfections, the owner of blessed qualities and higher than everything else. Being about to investigate the nature of meditation, the Sûtrakâra now declares that the meditating devotee receives the reward of meditation, i.e. Release, which consists in attaining to the highest Person, from that highest Person only: and that analogously the rewards for all works prescribed by the Veda--whether to be enjoyed in this or the next world--come from the highest Person only. The Sûtra therefore says generally, 'from thence the reward.'--'Why so?'--'Because that only is possible.'
For it is he only--the all-knowing, all-powerful, supremely generous one--who being pleased by sacrifices, gifts, offerings, and the like, as well as by pious meditation, is in a position to bestow the different forms of enjoyment in this and the heavenly world, and Release which consists in attaining to a nature like his own. For action which is non-intelligent and transitory is incapable of bringing about a result connected with a future time.
That he bestows all rewards--whether in the form of enjoyment or Release--Scripture also declares 'This indeed is the great, the unborn Self, the eater of food, the giver of
wealth' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 24); and 'For he alone causes delight' (Taitt. Up. II, 7).--Next a primâ facie view is stated
For the same reasons, viz. possibility and scriptural declaration, the teacher Gaimini thinks that religious works, viz. sacrifices, gifts, offerings, and meditation, of themselves bring about their rewards. For we observe that in ordinary life actions such as ploughing and the like, and charitable gifts and so on, bring about their own reward, directly or indirectly. And although Vedic works do not bring about their rewards immediately, they may do so mediately, viz. by means of the so-called apûrva. This follows also from the form of the Vedic injunctions, such as 'He who is desirous of the heavenly world is to sacrifice.' As such injunctions enjoin sacrifices as the means of bringing about the object desired to be realised, viz. the heavenly world and the like, there is no other way left than to assume that the result (which is seen not to spring directly from the sacrifice) is accomplished by the mediation of the apûrva.
The reverend Bâdarâyana maintains the previously declared awarding of rewards by the Supreme Person since the scriptural texts referring to the different sacrifices declare that the deities only, Agni, Vâyu, and so on, who are propitiated by the sacrifices--which are nothing else but means to propitiate deities--are the cause of the rewards attached to the sacrifices. Compare texts such as 'Let him who is desirous of prosperity offer a white animal to Vâyu. For Vâyu is the swiftest god. The man thus approaches Vâyu with his proper share, and Vâyu leads him to prosperity.' And the whole instruction which the texts give, as to the means by which men desirous of certain results are to effect those results, is required on account of the injunctions only, and hence it cannot be doubted that
p. 627
it has reference to the injunctions. The apparatus of means to bring about the results thus being learnt from the text only, no person acquainted with the force of the means of proof will assent to that apparatus, as stated by the text, being set aside and an apûrva about which the text says nothing being fancifully assumed. And that the imperative verbal forms of the injunctions denote as the thing to be effected by the effort of the sacrificer, only that which on the basis of the usage of language and grammatical science is recognised as the meaning of the root-element of such words as ' yageta,' viz. the sacrifice (yâga), which consists in the propitiation of a divine being, and not some additional supersensuous thing such as the apûrva, we have already proved above (p. 153 ff.). Texts such as 'Vâyu is the swiftest god' teach that Vâyu and other deities are the bestowers of rewards. And that it is fundamentally the highest Self--as constituting the inner Self of Vâyu and other deities--which is pleased by offerings, and bestows rewards for them is declared by texts such as 'Offerings and pious works, all this he bears who is the nave of the Universe. He is Agni and Vâyu, he is Sun and Moon' (Mahânâr. Up. I, 6, 7). Similarly in the antaryâmin-brâhmana, 'He who dwells in Vâyu, of whom Vâyu is the body'; 'He who dwells in Agni,' &c. Smriti expresses itself similarly, 'Whatsoever devotee wishes to worship with faith whatsoever divine form, of him do I make that faith unshakable. Endued with such faith he endeavours to propitiate him and obtains from him his desires--those indeed being ordained by me' (Bha. Gî. VII, 21-22); 'For I am the enjoyer and the Lord of all sacrifices' (IX, 24)--where Lord means him who bestows the reward for the sacrifices. 'To the gods go the worshippers of the gods, and those devoted to me go to me' (VII, 23). In ordinary life men, by agriculture and the like, acquire wealth in various forms, and by means of this propitiate their king, either directly or through his officials and servants; and the king thereupon is seen to reward them in a manner corresponding to the measure of their services and presents. The Vedânta-texts, on the other hand, give
p. 628
instruction on a subject which transcends the sphere of all the other means of knowledge, viz. the highest Person who is free from all shadow even of imperfection, and a treasure-house as it were of all exalted qualities in their highest state of perfection; on sacrifices, gifts, oblations, which are helpful towards the propitiation of that Person; on praise, worship, and meditation, which directly propitiate him; and on the rewards which he, thus propitiated, bestows, viz. temporal happiness and final Release.--Here terminates the adhikarana of 'reward.'
(My humble salutations to Sreeman George Thibaut for the collection)
0 comments:
Post a Comment